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The maker not the tool:
The cognitive significance of great ape manual skills.
Richard W Byrne (University of St Andrews)
[In V Roux and B Bril (Eds.) Knapping stone. A uniquely hominid behaviour?]
Tool-use by chimpanzees has attracted disproportionate attention among primatologists, because of an
understandable wish to understand the evolutionary origins of hominin tool use. In archaeology and
paleoanthropology, a focus on made-objects is inevitable: there is nothing else to study. However, it is evidently
object-directed manual skills, enabling the objects to be made, that are critical in understanding the evolutionary
origins of stone-tool manufacture. In this chapter I review object-directed manual skills in living great apes, making
comparison where possible with hominin abilities that can be inferred from the archaeological record. To this end,
‘translations’ of terminology between the research traditions are offered. Much of the evidence comes from
observation of apes gathering plants that present physical problems for handling and consumption, in addition to
the more patchy data from tool use in captivity and the field. The living great apes, like ourselves, build up novel
hierarchical structures involving regular sequences of elementary actions, showing co-ordinated manual role
differentiation, in modular organizations with the option of iterating subroutines. Further, great apes appear able
to use imitation of skilled practitioners as one source of information for this process, implying some ability to ‘see’
below the surface level of action and understand the motor planning of other individual; however, that process does
not necessarily involve understanding cause-and-effect or the intentions of other individuals. Finally I consider
whether a living non-human ape could effectively knap stone, and if not, what competence is lacking.
Only two years after Louis Leakey (1961) defined Man’s origin as the point at which an ape-like
creature first made tools to “a regular and set pattern”, Jane Goodall (1963) published her
evidence that the chimpanzees of Gombe did just that. The 40 years that followed have seen
many attempts to sharpen definitions—of human, of tool, and of what counts as a regular and
set pattern—to avoid the unfortunate syllogism that these facts point toward, and to gain a better
understanding of the origins and development of tool-making in humans. We now know that the
chimpanzee Pan troglodytes is not alone among living great apes in making tools (e.g. see Fox,
Sitompul and van Schaik, 1999), that chimpanzees make many different types of tool for
different purposes (Boesch & Boesch, 1990; Goodall, 1986; Nishida, 1986), and that the styles of
tool-making differ between chimpanzee communities (McGrew, 1992; McGrew, Tutin, &
Baldwin, 1979). Meanwhile, archaeological evidence has pushed the origins of flaked stone tools
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comfortable period when tall, large-brained ancestral humans lived over much of the Old World,
to African strata in which the few hominin bones are of small animals with chimpanzee-sized
brains, species not even classified in the genus Homo. These facts may seem to encourage
“continuity” theorizing, until the tools themselves are examined. The fact is, there is a big
difference between the most elaborate chimpanzee tool, a green twig stripped of its leaves, and
the 2.3 Mya stone tools showing organized sequential detachment of flakes. Put bluntly, any of
us can make any chimpanzee tool, without training and in a few seconds, but stone knapping is
an esoteric and difficult skill which excites admiration and awe even today. No living ape has
learnt to remove a flake in the way even 2.3 Mya hominins could (Toth, Schick, Savage-
Rumbaugh, Sevcik, & Rumbaugh, 1993; Wright, 1972). Are all efforts to understand pre-hominin
origins of human tool making doomed to disappointment?
Part of the difficulty with answering this question is the difference in evidence from
living great apes and extinct hominins. Behavioural observation of apes allows us to identify
tools made from grass, vine and woody material, tools that entirely comprise chimpanzee tool
manufacture; but we see only a snapshot in time, lacking any historical record (or even definite
fossils of chimpanzee ancestors). The only stone tool-use by chimpanzees, for cracking nuts
(Boesch & Boesch, 1990; Sugiyama & Koman, 1979), involves selection of found objects, thus
leaving no archaeological record except small piles of rocks. Conversely, the archaeological
record of early hominins entirely omits tools made of plant material, which presumably these
creatures were at least as well able to fashion as are modern chimpanzees; but this is
compensated by a rich time-series of tools, some associated with bones of particular hominin
species. If we insist on parity by ignoring tools made of non-fossilizing plant material, tool-
making becomes once more “uniquely human”: but ignoring evidence is no way to make
progress. (Unfortunately, just this approach remains frequent in more popular treatments of
human origins.) Even when direct comparison between tools of apes and hominins has been
made, it has inevitably been at a highly abstract level; and claims have been controversial
(McGrew, 1987; Wynn & McGrew, 1989).  This paper will argue for another way: let us back off
from this close-focus upon tools, stone or otherwise, and concentrate instead on their
psychological significance.
Surely the reason that for hundreds of years scholars have been content to define our
species as “Man the Tool-maker” is not because of any special symbolic meaning of tools, but
the fact that making tools is smart. Finding a delicately flaked stone arrowhead in the ground is
exciting to most people because of what it tells them about the mind of the tool-maker. The real
3significance of the earliest stone tools in the fossil record is the deductions they allow us to make
about the cognitive psychology of long-extinct hominins. The slight change of emphasis
immediately enables progress: we can compare two million year old hominins and modern
chimpanzees on the metric of psychological capacity, no matter where our evidence for those
capacities comes from. The lesson has perhaps been better grasped by paleo-archaeologists—
who have long attempted to reconstruct behaviour from the use of debitage, flaking sequences,
cut marks on bones, disposition of tools on floors and so on—than by primatologists, held in
thrall by the tyranny of the tool as detached object. Chimpanzees are the only ape species
commonly to make tools in the wild, and this has led to an inordinate concentration on the
chimpanzee, much puzzlement about the relative lack of tools in other great apes (e.g. McGrew,
1989), and theories that awkwardly postulate the secondary loss of tool-making abilities in apes
other than chimpanzees (e.g. Parker and Gibson, 1979). Let us instead concentrate our analyses
upon the process: of tool making, tool using, or any comparably skilled manual activities. This
brings immediate advantages from the point of view of the evolutionary psychologist. Study is
no longer restricted to species that make tools (which effectively meant to one species of ape, the
chimpanzee), but can be widened to any species that uses its hands or equivalent effector organs
in interesting ways: even raccoons, squirrels and parrots. That will allow more genuinely
comparative study. For reconstructing the evolution of human psychology, by examining the
manual dexterity and flexibility of non-human primates, starting with the great apes, we have
some prospect of gaining important clues to the evolutionary origin of technological skill. One
aim of the current paper, then, is to present a brief overview of the object-directed manual
skills of the living great apes, as presently known, in order that paleo-archaeologists may make
informed comparisons with the corresponding manual skills they deduce from the fossil record.
An additional problem in making productive comparisons between skills of living apes
and extinct hominins is that the two traditions of study have proceeded independently, and each
has needed to use technical terms. Often, wishing to avoid cumbersome jargon, researchers have
recruited everyday words and given them new, operational definitions. Unfortunately, the same
words may have been given very different definitions, a problem sometimes further
compounded by slightly different everyday meanings in English and French. For instance,
“technique” has been defined as “the practical manner of accomplishing a particular task”
(Inizan, Reduron-Ballinger, Roche, & Tixier, 1999), and “an ordered sequence of elements of
manual skill , coordinated so that the whole performance serves to {accomplish a purpose}”
(Byrne & Byrne, 1993b). These definitions may not sound incompatible, but in reality it is clear
that Inizan et al use the term for how a local purpose is achieved, such as whether a stone
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describe the overall organization of a task—almost the exact reverse. These terms are
understood perfectly by cognate researchers, but as soon as the two traditions attempt to talk to
each other, problems are likely to arise. To make any sort of worthwhile comparison, it is first
necessary to make terms mutually comprehensible. A secondary aim of this paper, then, is to
provide an approximate translation of terminology to allow better communication between
cognitive archaeology and cognitive primatology. Thus, whenever I introduce and define a term
used by primatologists to describe great ape manual capacities, I will attempt to provide the
equivalent term that has been used to describe equivalent behaviour within knapping (Bril,
Roux, & Dietrich, 2000; Inizan, et al., 1999; Roux, 2000).
Although I will not ignore the tool-making and tool-use unique of the chimpanzee (and
to one tool-using population of Sumatran orangutan Pongo abelii, a population which is now
probably extinct), I will concentrate on the preparation of “hard-to-process” plants for
consumption, a task that confronts all apes to a greater or lesser extent. My terminology was
developed originally while working with mountain gorillas Gorilla beringei engaged in terrestrial
herb feeding. Research employed both real-time observations in the field (Byrne & Byrne, 1991,
1993b), and more detailed analysis of video records of gorilla behaviour in the laboratory (Byrne,
Corp, & Byrne, 2001a, 2001b). The definitions were subsequently refined through extension to
chimpanzees, where difficult fruit processing was also examined (Corp & Byrne, 2002a, 2002b);
and to describe the compensations employed by snare-injured chimpanzees and gorillas who
cope with these challenging feeding tasks (Byrne & Stokes, 2002; Stokes & Byrne, 2001).
Comparable work has begun on the Bornean orangutan Pongo pygmaeus (Russon, 1998).
Manual challenges of plants
In this paper, the emphasis will be on plants which present special difficulties, and the
impression might be gained that most foods of great apes are hard to process, or that apes are
specialists on the more intractable plants found within their ranges. Compared with their closest
feeding competitors, the Old World monkeys, there may be some truth in this view (Byrne,
1997); however, great apes do of course avoid difficulties when they can. Most strikingly,
chimpanzees and western gorillas relish figs Ficus spp.(Wrangham et al., 1993). Because of the
fig’s unusual pollination method, its fruits normally contain living fig wasps and thus provide
protein as well as sugars. In regions of high density and year-round availability of figs, availability
of this balanced diet means that chimpanzees are able to avoid many of the problematic foods
they must eat elsewhere. For instance, at Budongo and Kibale, Uganda, chimpanzees do not feed
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abundance of figs in the ranges of some chimpanzee populations is therefore rather an
annoyance for cognitive psychologists! Because it is precisely when they are engaged with
manually challenging foods that we see the cognitive capacities of apes most clearly displayed,
fleshy fruits provide little useful information about manual skills. Even within leaf-eating tasks,
we have found that it is only the physically “defended” leaves which reveal many of the manual
capacities of most interest for comparison with hominid abilities, including an overall
hierarchical task organization (Corp & Byrne, 2002a).
Some of the plant-processing tasks that elicit complex manual strategies from great apes
are tasks readily comprehensible to Europeans and Americans who—like myself—are already
familiar with the some of challenges they would present for handling. This is the case because
the plants eaten by some great apes, such as mountain gorillas, are plants of the temperate zone
and as such are matched by closely related forms in the Holarctic. For instance, the nettle
Laportea alatipes, like the nettles familiar to northern Europeans, is more or less covered by
stinging hairs. The sting mechanism only activates as the leaf matures, so the topmost immature
leaves on a stem are relatively safe to touch. Stings are found all over mature leaves, the leaf
underside is less protected than the edges or upper surface. Worst to touch are the stems, both
that of the leaf (the petiole) or the main upright stem, which are densely covered by stings. As
children sometimes discover by trial and error, but are often told, a firm grip is less painful,
because the sting mechanism is delicate and can often be crushed before it triggers; conversely, a
light touch can be very unpleasant. (Hence the English phrase, “grasping the nettle”.) For the
mountain gorillas of Karisoke, Rwanda, Laportea leaves are one of the four most frequent plants
items in the diet (Watts, 1984). This is not surprising since they are rich in protein and low in
indigestible lignin (Waterman, Choo, Vedder, & Watts, 1983). However, the reactions of young
gorillas show that they find contact with nettle plants painful and aversive, just as humans do
(pers obs.). Other plants of similar importance in gorilla diet, like the thistle Carduus nyassanus and
the bedstraw Galium ruwenzoriense share the same genus and the same difficulties for handling as
common wayside plants of late summer in Europe and America.  Galium is a clambering plant,
adapted to this way of growing by numerous minute hooks on the edges of leaf and stem; these
hooks hinder swallowing, and could easily trigger choking. Like all the terrestrial herbs staple to
gorilla diet, Carduus is highly nutritious, but it is defended from animals by long, tough spines on
the leaves and the winged extensions of the stem.
Chimpanzees are restricted to tropical zones, and the challenges they face in plant-
handling are less familiar. Two plants in particular have been found to test the manual abilities of
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Budongo, Uganda, in a failed attempt to establish paper-making. Its leaves are covered on one
side with woolly hairs that, like the hooks of Galium, make swallowing difficult (Stokes, 1999;
Stokes & Byrne, 2001), and Saba florida, a vine whose baseball-sized fruits are delicious and high
in sugars, but which are difficult to open neatly enough to gain the flesh (Corp & Byrne, 2002b).
Orangutans have attracted far less study than chimpanzees or mountain gorillas (though even
less has yet been possible with western gorillas Gorilla gorilla or bonobos Pan paniscus, whose
manual skills in the wild remain sadly unexplored).  However, orangutans; approach to the
problem of obtaining the nutritious meristem of new leaves of the palm Borassodendron borneensis,
defended by razor-sharp edges of the surrounding leaf petioles, shows many parallels with the
manual skills of Africa great apes (Russon, 1998).
The smallest functional units of action
Suppose a leaf needs to be folded, as is the case when a gorilla eats nettle (because folding wraps
a whole bundle of stinging nettle leaves and exposes only the relatively sting-free leaf underside).
There are many ways for an ape to do it. Holding with precision grips of thumb and first finger
of a different hand at either end, one hand may be rotated until the leaf is folded, then the thumb
of the other hand moved to hold both leaf ends; or, holding only one end of the leaf with a
scissor grip of digits 2 and 3 (Christel, 1993; Marzke & Wullstein, 1995; Napier, 1961), the index
finger of the other hand can push the leaf tip over until it can be held by opposition of thumb
against the two fingers; and so on. There are literally dozens of ways of achieving this single
function (Byrne & Byrne, 1993b). They presumably vary in efficiency, for instance in how
quickly the job can be done, whether the method is reliable in every case, and whether the hand
can simultaneously be used for another purpose—perhaps retaining already-folded leaves to add
to the bundle. However, in a sense, the variation is unimportant compared to the fact that any of
the alternatives allow the job to be done.  (Although practically-inclined readers may be
interested to know that for a gorilla, much the most popular and apparently efficient method is
to fold a bundle of nettle leaves over the thumb of the hand grasping the bundle with a power
grip, using a tip-to-tip precision grip of the complementary hand, then re-grasp the folded bundle
with the thumb over which it was folded.)
Distinguishing every variant that differed in the digits involved and the overall form of
movements made, we found that gorillas employ a very large number these elementary units of
action, which we called elements. For instance, in gorillas eating the pith and leaves of Carduus
thistle, we found 222 elements in detailed analysis of data from 14 individuals processing up to
740 handfuls of thistle (Byrne et al., 2001b). Moreover, we showed that this count had by no
means reached asymptote, and the same was true for other plant-processing tasks. Such variation
may have rather little significance in terms of the overall range of tasks which can be tackled, and
in any case we had no way in the field of measuring the mechanical efficiency of each variant, or
charting the changes in motor proficiency during development. Instead, we ‘lumped’ elements
that resulted in the same change made to the plant material. For thistle, there were 46 functionally
distinct elements, and this estimate was found to be much closer to asymptote. When the
functionally distinct elements for two other leaf-processing tasks were combined (see Byrne and
Byrne, 1993), we found a total set of 53. This approach offers a simple way of comparing tasks in
their manual complexity at a relatively elemental level (Byrne et al., 2001b); when comparable
analysis has been performed for other great apes, it will be possible to compare species and
populations that use their skills for very different tasks.
Our FUNCTIONALLY DISTINCT ELEMENT is probably closest to the term
ELEMENTARY GESTURE used  in the analysis of knapped stone (Bril et al., 2000), although
it is perhaps more conservative in potentially lumping together very different ways for achieving
the general effect with the plant material. (In practice, because we think that this lowest level of
variation in ape data is mainly a matter of trivial differences in grips and the specific fingers
involved, we would suspect that counts of elements from human and ape might reasonably be
compared.)
Presumably, in both living ape and hominin, the mode of effect and practical use of each
functionally distinct element of action are mostly discovered by trial and error, but sometimes
imitation may also be valuable. Anecdotal evidence suggests this is sometimes the case in gorillas
(Byrne, 1999 p.343-5). Mountain gorillas forage out of visual contact with other adults; only as an
infant does a gorilla have the chance to watch closely while another individual is feeding: its own
mother. At adolescence, all female gorillas leave their natal group and move away to join another
group, sometimes moving more than once.  However, a female joining a group whose range is in
a different habitat to her that in which she grew up has no opportunity to learn locally-
appropriate skills by imitation. Intriguingly one such female, Picasso, whose natal range did not
include nettle, never learnt the “folding” described at the start of this section. Moreover, her
juvenile offspring also failed to learn the trick. Perhaps folding is difficult to discover without a
model to copy, and until one of Picasso’s descendants gets a lucky break and either discovers
folding for itself or sees another gorilla doing it, they may be in for a painful time eating nettle
leaves.
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Most manual actions of monkeys are carried out with a single hand, and often the other hand is
in use simultaneously to support the body. The more upright body-carriage of great apes allows
bimanual use of the hands, particularly if the animal is in the sitting posture favoured by gorillas.
In addition, the mobile lips of great apes, especially the chimpanzee, mean that the mouth can
sometimes be used almost as a “third hand”. Most obviously, two hands can be used jointly to
apply double the force to an object. Such symmetrical bimanual use of the hand is presumably
relatively straightforward for the brain to program. In contrast, asymmetric bimanual action, in which
the two hands are used in different and complementary ways (and for this reason it is sometimes
called “complementary bimanual action”), likely demands considerable neural flexibility.
Asymmetric bimanual processing displays what has been called manual role differentiation
(Elliott & Connolly, 1984), in which the two hands must separately achieve different functions in
different ways, yet be coordinated together both in space and time. As an example, consider how
asymmetric bimanual action is central to a gorilla’s processing of nettle to eat. In processing a
single plant, four different uses of asymmetric bimanual hand action may be employed: if the
ground is soft, in order for the leaves to be efficiently stripped off the stem the other hand will
be needed to support the stem base securely; then, it is essential that the two hands can be
opposed to twist-off or tear-apart the leaf blades from the petioles, which re discarded; next, any
debris that contaminates the bundle will be picked out, with delicate use of tip-to-tip precision
grip of one hand while the other loosely retains the bundle; finally, the folding of the leaves to
encase the parcel in a single leaf underside crucially depends on asymmetric bimanual action. The
assignment of hand to role is highly lateralized: a gorilla that uses the right hand to hold the leaf-
bundle and the left to fold it over, will hardly ever reverse these roles. For a given task, and a
given animal, the asymmetry in manual action is highly stable.
Asymmetric bimanual hand use with manual role differentiation is apparently rare or
absent in monkey species (but see Boinski, Quatrone and Swartz, 2001), yet it has been widely
reported in great apes (e.g. Boesch & Boesch, 1990; Byrne & Byrne, 1991; Byrne et al., 2001a;
Fox et al., 1999; Russon, 1998; see also (Fragaszy, 1998). The importance of this ability for
chimpanzees, when they crack nuts with hammer and anvil, can clearly be seen in Boesch and
Boesch’s (1993) analysis of hand posture in this task.
Coordination can also occur within a single hand, if the digits can be controlled
independently.  This digit role differentiation is probably impossible for most mammals, including
monkeys, and certainly has not been described until recently (Byrne et al., 2001a).  Once again,
however, it may well be rather routine for great apes. For instance, nettle processing would be
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few leaf blades to eat, especially from the perspective of a huge silverback male gorilla.
However, in fact it is routine to see a part-processed bundle of leaves retained in part of the hand
(either digits 2 and 3, or 4 and 5, are commonly used), while a new plant is processed to the same
stage (Byrne & Byrne, 1991).  The accumulation may take place (1) once the leaves of a stem
have been stripped off in a compact whorl; or (2) it may be delayed until leaf petioles have also
been detached, thus allowing the iteration of a longer sequence of processing actions.  Either
way, the facility enables the edible part of several plants to be accumulated, and critically relies on
digit role differentiation (Byrne et al., 2001a).  All the main food plants of mountain gorillas are
processed in ways that rely on this within-the-hand accumulation (Byrne & Byrne, 1991),
illustrating the importance of digit role differentiation for this species.  The ability has not been
studied in other great apes, but a review by Fragaszy (1998) points out it may be important to
them also: for instance, nut-cracking chimpanzees hold intact nuts in the same hand that they use
to position and support a nut on an anvil for striking.
Within writing on stone knapping, little has been made of the importance of bimanual
asymmetric coordination between the hands and digit role differentiation within the hand:
perhaps, because these abilities are so familiar in our own species that their absences is
unimaginable in other hominins. Bimanual asymmetric coordination would appear to be
absolutely essential for any skilled stone working to take place, and digit role differentiation—
while perhaps not essential—is certainly used routinely when a stone’s position is adjusted within
the hand by a modern stone knapper.
So far, we have considered skill at what has been called the “action level” (Byrne &
Russon, 1998). Effectiveness at this level is a matter of (1) how well an action is carried out, the
gradual increase in efficiency of motor movement that comes with long practice (something that cannot
be effectively studied in observational studies of wild animals, although it is a prominent part of
discussions of skill in humans e.g. Welford, 1968); (2) the size of repertoire of functionally distinct
elements of action, providing both different ways of achieving effects (in stone knapping
parlance, different TECHNIQUES to achieve a similar end: Inizan et al, 1999) and alternative
ways of achieving a single effect.  Having several alternative ways to achieve the same purpose
sounds like unnecessary redundancy, but for an animal that may need to forage in tall trees while
safely supporting its bulk, the option to carry out a normally bimanual action with one hand may
be critical. This sort of flexibility also confers an unexpected benefit on great apes: the chance to
survive after maiming of the hands, which sadly occurs in many areas of Africa as a consequence
of snares set by humans. Young apes are highly curious, and liable to explore novel objects with
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their hands, with grim consequences (Stokes, Quiatt, & Reynolds, 1999). Not all die of their
injuries, however, and those that survive have been found to show quite remarkable
accommodations to their severe disablement (Byrne & Stokes, 2003; Byrne & Stokes, 2002;
Stokes & Byrne, 2001), using a very different range of action elements to achieve the same
functions as their able-bodied counterparts, but nevertheless achieving comparable feeding
efficiency.
To deal with complex manual problems however, another type of skill is also required:
the ability to build up programmes of goal-directed action out of constituent elements of action,
and it is to this ability we turn next.
Building up elements into hierarchical organization
In principle, the organization of a programme of goal-directed actions might be linear: a string of
elements, joined together into a chain of actions whose sequential application achieves the
desired effect. This possibility has great attraction to psychologists within the learning theory
tradition, because of the computational simplicity or “parsimony” of the associative process
needed to construct linear strings. (Indeed, the assumption that associative chaining could
account for all human behaviour was central to the doctrine of behaviourism.) Imitative learning
of string-like structures of action—called “action level imitation by Byrne & Russon, 1998—can
be accommodated by an associative process, with some modification of the basic theory (Heyes
& Ray, 2000).
No doubt, some animals can only acquire novel complex behaviour by action-level
imitation, producing an undifferentiated linear sequence of actions; many animals probably do so
frequently; and even humans certainly do so sometimes. Consider, for instance, the ability to
mimic the style and mannerisms of another person that some comics use to devastating satirical
effect. More significantly, we may copy in a linear fashion when we cannot “see below the
surface” of a smooth performance to understand its organization, and in the process of imitation
we may gain more insight into that organization.
However, it is now thoroughly accepted within psychology that human skills are normally
hierarchically organized (Chomsky, 1959; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960; Newell & Simon,
1972), and that this applies at every point from tying shoelaces to constructing a novel sentence.
Increasingly, there is evidence that the manual skills of great apes also show hierarchical
organization: they are structured more like a branching tree than a linear chain, and large
branches or small twigs can be dealt with as units, allowing great flexibility. Gorillas, for instance,
are able both to omit parts of an otherwise rather standardized sequence of actions, if there is no
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need on occasion to perform one particular action, or alternatively to repeat a section of the
normal program iteratively to a criterion (Byrne & Byrne, 1993b). The section of program
repeated, and thus treated as a single module, may be short or quite long. (A program in this
context is an organized sequence of motor actions used to process potential food into a form
suitable for ingestion; a module is a section of a program that can be treated as an independent
unit, for instance by repetition, omission or use in a different program altogether.) In nettle
eating, the whole sequence of pull a stem into range, hold the base while the other hand strips up the stem,
grasp the petioles to twist or lever them off the leaf blades may be repeated, while already-processed leaf
blades are retained in the lower fingers of one hand, showing that this sequence can form a
module. This allows a gorilla to accumulate a larger handful of nettle leaves to eat. Modules
which achieve a common function may be shared between two otherwise very different programs.
And unlike the “fixed action patterns” of classical ethology, a gorilla’s program for dealing with
plant food can be interrupted—provided the interruption occurs at a module boundary—and
resumed smoothly later, allowing individuals often to stop mid-process, scan the environment,
interact vocally with others, etc. before continuing to process the same handful. Orangutans also
organize their motor planning in a hierarchical way (Byrne & Russon, 1998; Russon, 1998), as do
chimpanzees (Stokes & Byrne, 2001).
Hierarchical organization of learned behaviour is likely common to all great apes (the
manual behaviour of the bonobo has not yet been studied under natural conditions, but in
captivity the species appears to have similar manual abilities to the chimpanzee). The ability to
schedule novel hierarchical structures, themselves composed of smaller, familiar components,
means that great apes have generative manual skill (Case, 1985; Corballis, 1991): a limited range of
basic motor components can be combined in many different ways to produce a potentially
unlimited range of skills. Most animals, even other non-human primates, show no such
generative ability in their actions: essentially, their motor repertoires are fixed, and all that can be
learnt is in under what circumstances to use an action, and how firmly or gently it should be
applied. The fact that the living apes, our closest relatives, show generativity in manual skills is
significant for two reasons. Most relevant to this chapter, generative manual ability is an
important precursor of hominin tool construction; but in addition, it means that the closest to
syntax in the natural behaviour of great apes is in the hand action, not their voices (which are
restricted to a fixed and presumably innate repertoire of signals: Marler & Tenaza, 1977).
Hierarchically organized structures of manual action, in which the constituent modules are
themselves built up out of more elementary action components, have been called
TECHNIQUES in primate work, a very different usage from that of archaeology. The closest
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equivalent in archaeology is probably the PLAN OF ACTION (Bril et al., 2000), or METHOD
(Inizan et al., 1999). The term SEQUENTIAL ORGANIZATION has also been used, but it is
important to realize that in knapping as in ape plant preparation the organization is hierarchical,
not simply a linear sequence.
 The pattern of variance in the gorilla data (i.e. idiosyncratic at low levels of description,
such as the precise form of elements or the manual laterality, but highly standardized at the level of
the overall structure) has been used to argue for the importance of program-level imitation in
acquisition (Byrne, 1998; Byrne & Byrne, 1993a; Byrne & Russon, 1998). In program-level imitation
the imitator ‘sees’ and copies the underlying planning structure, but may well use its own way of
achieving many of the actions copied  (Note that slavish copying of low-level manual elements
may well be inefficient, whereas trial-and-error exploration often efficiently homes in on the
optimum.) The idea that apes can learn by program-level imitation has been subsequently
supported by analysis of the behaviour of disabled chimpanzees in the wild (Byrne & Stokes,
2002; Stokes & Byrne, 2001). Young apes are highly curious, and vulnerable to disabling and
often fatal injuries when they explore snares set to catch other animals. Nevertheless, some
survive, and go on to manage to eat foods which require complex processing. If their normal
skills developed solely by individual exploration, one would expect highly idiosyncratic
techniques to be acquired by disabled animals. However, if imitation is necessary to acquire a
skilled technique, and the only available model (the mother) is able-bodied, then hers is the
technique  that must perforce be acquired. The latter pattern was found: disabled apes use the
same overall method as able-bodied ones, working round the local problems caused by their
disablement.
In program-level imitation, what is essential is the opportunity to watch a skilled
performer at work for a long time: only then can statistical regularities in the behaviour betray the
underlying planning structure (Byrne, 2002, 2003). Young apes have abundant opportunities of
this kind, and perhaps the same was true of the children of hominin knappers. Teaching, in
contrast, may be less important when great apes learn elaborate motor skills. Active
demonstration was seen only twice in an 11 year project on the acquisition of chimpanzee nut-
cracking (Boesch, 1991b) and has not been noted again since. None at all was seen in a study of
acquisition of Saba florida processing, the most complex plant feeding task for the Mahale,
Tanzania, chimpanzee population (Corp & Byrne, 2002b).  Instead, both studies noted that the
behaviour of mother chimpanzees makes many opportunities available to their infants that may
have beneficial consequences for their learning. In particular, mothers allow infants and juveniles
to watch them closely, scrounge food, and interact with aspects of their own food preparation
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(e.g. stone tools). However, Corp and Byrne questioned whether the mothers intend (or are
adapted to produce) an effect upon learning. They noted that despite repeated begging by infants
below 1 year, mothers do not share Saba florida pith, while when the infant is over one year they
share readily, even sometimes offering the pith. This pattern is more consistent with a nutritional
effect: below a year, lactation cannot be replaced or reduced by supplemental pith feeding,
whereas the infant is presumably at least as well able to learn about the task.
Could a living great ape learn to knap stone?
Living great apes evidently possess many manual skills that are directly comparable to those
of hominin stone knappers. Their hands are surprisingly dextrous, allowing a range of
precision as well as power grips (especially in the gorilla, whose relatively long thumb and
short fingers are most similar in proportion to those of modern humans). A large range of
differentiated manual actions are performed, specific to functions required for particular
tasks. This gives ample testament to apes’ ability to learn novel motor actions, including
deftly coordinated bimanual actions, in which the two hands take complementary roles
simultaneously. In addition, fingers can be independently manipulated, allowing a single
hand to carry out two different functions at once: for instance, picking up a small object while
retaining a tight bundle of stems in other fingers. Dependent upon the flexibility of motor
learning in all great apes, the extensive repertoire of manual actions for achieving different
functions seems to be learnt mainly by individual exploration and trial and error, because the
fine details vary idiosyncratically across the population. However, chains of different actions
can be built up into complex programs, at least 5 steps in length, and these more elaborate
constructions are learnt partly by imitation. The process of constructing action sequences
from smaller components is hierarchical, allowing flexibility in response to environmental
need, efficient modular organization, and enlargement of the repertoire in a generative and
‘productive’ way. These abilities would appear to allow the rudiments of stone knapping to
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be done, although certainly would not be sufficient to account for the stone tools of early
modern humans, which show clear evidence of being made to a preconceived plan 1.
So, why do living apes not make stone tools? Before jumping to conclusions about
cognitive limitations, it may be worth noting that most living apes do not make tools at all,
although there is little doubt they are capable of doing so, and readily do in captivity when
given tasks experimentally (McGrew, 1989). It is evident that bonobos, gorillas, almost all
orangutans, and some populations of chimpanzees, have no reason in the wild to embark on
tool-making: they manage just fine in their environment without needing tools. (Some part of
the reason for this is no doubt the absence of tasks for which a tool is a suitable solution, but
much more often it will be due to the availability of alternative, simpler sources of the same
nutrients.)  Might modern apes be capable of knapping? Experimental studies in captivity
suggest that the answer is probably no. Both an orangutan and a bonobo have learned to flake
a stone in order to obtain a sharp flake (Toth et al., 1993; Wright, 1972). However, the
orangutan was extensively trained by the experimenter, and had the advantage that the core
was held in place artificially for it. The bonobo, a ‘language’ trained ape, was simply shown
simple knapping by the experimenter, and presented with a task that depended on cutting a
rope. Rather than knap a hand-held rock, it preferred to throw the rock at the hard ground:
this was effective in shattering the rock, and the bonobo then carefully selected a sharp flake
to use. Since this was in fact effective, and the ape clearly understood the cause-and-effect of
sharp flakes and cutting, it is hard to know what to make of its ‘failure’ to knap in classic
                                                          
1 It is controversial whether some or all of the stone tools of earlier hominins would also
require the ability to envisage the finished product in advance and so guide the entire process
of flaking. For most pre-sapiens tools, variation in types is extensive and no advance plan is
evident. In contrast, the Acheulean hand-exe and the Levallois flake are relatively
standardized, suggesting a real plan [Mithen, 1996 #1726]. However, Davidson (2002;
Davidson and Noble, 1993)[ #3384; #201] interprets these distinctive forms more prosaically.
He argues that much of the ‘standardization’ of the hand-axe reflects selection by modern
archaeologists, and that in fact the distribution of ancient bifaces includes a wide range of
forms. Moreover, he suggests that the desired product was usually the flakes not the final
core, which thus represents the leftover stone from which no more flakes can be detached.
Dibble (1987, 1989)[#3383; #205] earlier suggested that much of the patterning in artefacts
of the French Mousterian can be explained in terms of the processes of reduction, given
differential availability of raw materials.  Davidson goes further, interpreting the large, ‘final’
flake of the Levallois technique as a (failed) attempt to open up the core to allow more
detachments (i.e. produce an acute angle at its edge), making the point that in the cases where
this was successful the core would have been flaked further, so the evidence necessarily no
longer exists. Needless to say, these views are not accepted by many researchers, but
resolution of this controversy will require new evidence.
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hominin fashion: if you can invent a safe and effective method, why bother to imitate a
riskier and trickier one?
Alternatively, it may very well be that no living great ape is capable of learning the
motor skill involved in aiming a powerful and accurate blow at an object held in the other
hand: it is the combination that may be beyond them, because there is no doubt that living
apes have both great limb power and delicate precision ability, in separate contexts (Goodall,
1986). Some evidence for this conjecture comes from manual laterality, which appears to
develop mainly in the context of “difficult” tasks2. All the skilled plant preparation of the
mountain gorilla is highly lateralized at the individual level (Byrne & Byrne, 1991). Most of
the natural manual behaviour of chimpanzees, like that of monkeys, lacks clear lateralization:
in captivity, individual lateral preferences are found with repetitive tasks, but their
significance—both statistical and functional—is controversial (Marchant & McGrew, 1996;
McGrew & Marchant, 2001; Warren, 1980). The exceptions to this generalization, cases
where chimpanzees do develop strong individual lateralization in the wild, are mostly tasks
that require skilled use of tools or aimed percussion of objects (Boesch, 1991a; McGrew &
Marchant, 1996; McGrew, Marchant, Wrangham, & Klein, 1999; Sugiyama, Fushimi,
Sakura, & Matsuzawa, 1993). For this reason, lateral specialization has often been associated
with skilled tool use (e.g. McGrew and Marchant, 1996). Alternatively, Byrne & Byrne
(1991; see & Byrne, Corp and Byrne, 2001) noted the cognitive complexity of asymmetric
bimanual coordination, also a feature of those chimpanzee tasks eliciting individual laterality,
and—crucially—found in all the highly lateralized but non tool-using gorilla activities. Byrne
and Byrne suggested that it was instead asymmetric bimanual coordination that benefited
from strong lateralization: when the two hands need to take distinctively different roles in a
single task, it pays not to switch roles between left and right hands. The correlation with tool-
use and percussion is a coincidence of the particular chimpanzee tasks that needed bimanual
coordination.
Humans, of course, also show population-level manual laterality, “handedness”, and
this has generally been assumed to be critical to the highest echelons of manual skill, as for
                                                          
2  It is not really clear in what aspect of the tasks this difficulties resides. McGrew and
Marchant (1999)[#2543] argue that laterality makes for increased neural efficiency, and
support this with evidence that more highly lateralized chimpanzees are quicker at
processing. However, Byrne and Byrne (1991), who showed the same correlation in gorillas,
noted that hand preference inevitably meant an asymmetry in practice, and more practice will
anyway lead to greater efficiency.
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instance in writing. It is therefore intriguing that gorilla leaf-eating tasks—which are more
complex in various ways than pith-extraction tasks—show weak but statistically significant
population right-handedness (Byrne & Byrne, 1991; Byrne et al., 2001a). Gorillas are more
likely to be lateralized so that precise actions are performed right-handed, with the left hand
as a support. Could it be that manual role differentiation not only predisposes apes towards
strong laterality, but also benefits from an inherited population bias towards particular hand
assignment—right handed precision? This speculation is supported by Hopkins’ (1995) study
of an asymmetric bimanual task in captivity, where strong individual laterality and significant
population right-handedness were found, whereas no population effects had been detected in
wild chimpanzee tasks. Now, however, population-level manual laterality has at last been
found in wild chimpanzees, when eating Saba florida (Corp & Byrne, 2003), with females
showing right- and males left-handedness. Importantly for the present discussion, this task
requires both great power (to tear open the hard fruits), and delicate precision (to remove
flesh without loss), in close alternation.  If the expressed laterality is a sign of difficulty for
the apes, it may well be beyond the capability of a modern chimpanzee, gorilla or orangutan,
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